Interview with E. Gregory Kryza

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR E. GREGORY KRYZA

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Today is June 14, 1988. This is an interview with Ambassador E. Gregory Kryza concerning his career as a Senior Officer. This interview is being done on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. My name is Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Mr. Ambassador, how did you become interested in foreign affairs?

KRYZA: First, I am delighted to be here. How did I become interested in foreign affairs? Probably in a most indirect way. I'm going to focus on my entry into the Foreign Service.

Q: Absolutely.

KRYZA: In 1947 I was a Junior Naval Officer on board the USS Shenandoah, which carried the flag for what is now the Fifth Fleet. And we paid a call on Athens, Greece. The Embassy which was just rebuilding after the war put on a reception for us. I was very impressed by one, I guess in those days a rather junior officer whose name is Tony Ross, Ambassador Claude Ross. I'm sure he doesn't remember this. But I had, I thought, a rather lengthy and interesting conversation with him about —

Q: By the way, we've done an interview — I didn't do it, but an interview is going to be done with Claude Ross.

KRYZA: So much so that later on in that year our ship moved on. The war was over and I had no commitment to remain in the Navy — I was a reserve officer. I had an opportunity to take a job in the Naval Attach#'s Office in Tangier, Morocco, as a civil servant. Which I did. The ship happened to be in Gibraltar when I was, so-called, mustered out. I took the ferry boat across the Straights of Gibraltar and there I was assigned to the Office of the U.S. Naval Attach# in Tangier, Morocco. Of course, there I had the opportunity to observe some real, real stars in action. People like the late Ambassador Bud Sherer, Curt Strong and various other Officers, most of whom fared very well in their Foreign Service careers.

I remained there for two and a half years. It was there that I met my bride, a beautiful French lady who was a professeur an lycee in Rabat. We met in a very unusual way as well. I had been a naval aviator and for some reason or other she was involved in some aero club in Rabat. And a friend of hers introduced her to me, and her first question was would you like to buy a ticket to a charity, whatever it was, function to support this aero club? Later on she was transferred from the girls lycee in Rabat to the girls lycee in Tangier, which put her a lot closer to me. One thing led to another and two years later we were married. Unfortunately, she died after 33 years of marriage, about six years ago.

Q: I'm very sorry. Were people sort of trying to recruit you into the Foreign Service at that time when you were in Tangier? Or had you just got the idea you'd do it yourself?

KRYZA: I don't think there was any active recruiting. But I must say I was terribly impressed with what they were doing and how they did it. I felt that that was going to be my way of life if I could manage it.

Q: How did you then get into the Foreign Service?

KRYZA: As a result of our marriage. Those days the Office of Naval Intelligence was extremely strict; if you married someone who was a foreigner, number one, you had to resign on paper at least until your prospective spouse was checked out. And you had to be transferred. I was given the choice of going to Australia —and I didn't want to take my new bride that far away from her home and culture. The other alternative was the Dominican Republic, which we opted for. While in the Dominican Republic I believe I took the Foreign Service exam. I scored what I would consider to be a near miss. I was then called back —this was during the time of the Korean War—I was called back on active duty. They put me through a six month sort of junior war college, the post-graduate school for naval intelligence here at Anacostia, which is now the DIA Intelligence School. DIA standing for Defense Intelligence Agencies. I was not able to take the exam that year because I didn't have the time.

Q: As I recall, in fact, I know. Because I took the exam during the Korean War in 1953 and it was a three and a half day exam.

KRYZA: That's right. It was a three and a half day exam. And also there was an upward limit. I don't think you could be, I think if you were 30 years of age or older.

Q: I think there was something like that, yes.

KRYZA: So my assignment in the Navy after completion of the post-graduate naval intelligence course was to the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic. Now, if you served in the Navy, I was what is called in naval parlance a plank owner which means I was one of the original officers to go on board. In fact, I was the first U.S. citizen Naval Intelligence Officer to come on board. In fact, Winston Churchill had not yet given his final nihil obstat or imprimatur to the location of the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic. I believe he wanted to have it on the other side of the ocean. But in any event we wound up in Norfolk, Virginia.

And once again I was frustrated. I was unable to take the exam because I was in the midst of learning a new job and we were doing all sorts of war games during the time of the—turn that off? (break in tape) —of the strangest people.

Q: Okay.

KRYZA: Where were we? Oh, I couldn't take the exam.

Q: You couldn't take the exam.

KRYZA: I was frustrated again. But I did want to get in. And I applied for a staff position, FSS.

Q: This is Foreign Service Staff Officer?

KRYZA: Foreign Service Staff. This is before the days of—I'm sure the structure has changed many times since then. This was the end of 1952. I was then 30 years old. The only jobs that were available, and I did have some background in it, was in the field of accounting. So I was named Disbursing Officer in Curacao in the Dutch West Indies. But that was a marvelous first tour of duty for someone who was not an FSO. Because it was a very small post, a relatively senior Consul General who had jurisdiction over the small consulate in Aruba as well as the post in Paramaribo in Suriname, Paramaribo. There were two Vice Consuls in addition to the Consul General and a secretary. And as a consequence I literally was able to sweep out the bank. I did everything. Everybody did everything. And since I was fairly ambitious, within a matter of weeks they sprinkled some holy water on me and made me a Vice Consul. I became immersed in everything except immigrant visa work. I was the Security Officer for the Post and I did some low level economic, very low level political reporting as well. And really enjoyed it.

Two years later it was almost a come down, because I had been used to doing so many things — the accounting work was something I did in my spare time, perhaps one-tenth

or less of my total work week — and it was almost a come down to be transferred to Brussels, Belgium as the U.S. Disbursing Officer at the Embassy. But once again I was extremely lucky. They were shorthanded and instead of being the Disbursing Officer I suddenly became the Budget and Fiscal Officer which is one step higher in the hierarchy. And lo and behold, suddenly—oh, then I'm not sure whether I came in via the Wriston or whether it was another form of lateral entry.

Q: We're talking about the Wriston Act or the

Wriston program.

KRYZA: I actually did not have enough—the lateral entry via the Wriston Program required X number of years of service either as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer or a Foreign Service Staff Officer. I didn't qualify for those years. But in any event, I was lateral-entried as an FSO-6 which in those days was the junior-most rank.

Less than a year later they created two more grades, 7 and 8 and I was moved downwards from FSO-6 to FSO-7. But in any event, as luck would have it, the Administrative Officer's job was vacant for about four months because of transfers and home leaves. And lo and behold I was the Administrative Officer as an FSO-7 at a fairly large post, a job that would normally require an FSO-3. Once again, in Brussels I was terribly impressed with my colleagues, people like Sheldon Vance, Art Tienken, for example. A lot of good people, Phil Sprouse, the late Phil Sprouse who was one of the old China hands who luckily eventually was able to get his own post. As you may recall, the people who were involved in China before the communists moved in were tainted.

Q: Yeah, that was part of the McCarthy era.

KRYZA: Exactly, exactly.

Q: The old China hands were accused of being communist dupes at best.

KRYZA: From Brussels we had a clear view of the Belgian Congo. Our embassy was very much involved. This was, of course, pre-independence but independence obviously—the winds of change were beginning to blow in Africa.

Q: So you were beginning to get sort of a feel for the area that you were going to specialize in.

KRYZA: Yes. Then very, very quickly, after two and a half years in Brussels I was assigned once again as Budget and Fiscal Officer to the Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Once again I was able to do more than just be the Budget and Fiscal Officer. I was given other tasks that were more substantive in some ways than administrative. There we also had high quality officers, although I don't think any of them were lucky enough to attain the rank of Ambassador, among my peers.

That was followed by a four-year stint in the Department of State in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs where I came on board as a Budget Officer. I'm not sure what my title was. But once again because people were moving back and forth I found myself—I was supposed to be number three in that Budget Office and I wound up literally running it after about six months.

Q: Could we talk a little about the budgetary process from the Washington point of view. I mean, looking back on this with some perspective, how many posts were there? Not the exact number but what did you have? About ten, twenty posts?

KRYZA: In NEA, which stands for Near East South Asia, more than that. There were five embassies in the South Asian portion of it. In those days Greece and Turkey were part of the NEA Bureau, I believe they're now part of the European Bureau.

Q: Yes, they moved over there in the '70s.

KRYZA: So there must have been a half dozen of what was referred to as GTI. Well, no, Greek, Turkey and Iran. And then you had the whole cluster of the NE, the Near East post. So I think we're talking 20 to 25.

Q: How about the allocation of money there? Did you get involved in who gets what?

KRYZA: Oh, very much so. It was not so much the allocation, well, the end result was the allocation to the post, the real work came from obtaining reimbursements from the many other agencies involved in the conduct of foreign relations.

Q: We're talking about CIA.

KRYZA: We're talking about CIA.

Q: Military.

KRYZA: Military.

Q: The Treasury.

KRYZA: Treasury, USAID, whatever it was called in those days, I believe ICA. The most difficult function in the regional bureau's budget office was to obtain a fair share of money to support the personnel and the activities of these various other agencies that were involved.

Q: Was there a running battle all the time?

KRYZA: Yes.

Q: Which I assume goes on probably today.

KRYZA: Yes, indeed. But I think during those days, and I played a role in it, they developed a concept of shared administrative expense, in fact, established another budget

which was fed by all of the agencies and departments, including the U.S. Department of State. It was managed by the Department of State. The concept was a very good one. Why have several administrative infrastructures at the same post when you could combine your forces and have just one? Now, you had the usual turf battles and the jealousies between various agencies. But as it worked out in almost all cases it was the Department of State, that is the Embassy's Administrative Office, that ran the shared administrative support activities that provided administrative support for these other agencies. The biggest difficulty was developing a format to obtain monies from the CIA. And we in NEA developed that format which was then adopted by the rest of the—

Q: What was the problem?

KRYZA: The problem was convincing—well, the formula prior to that, we discovered, was shortchanging the U.S. Department of State. It was providing—how classified can I get?

Q: Not classified at all.

KRYZA: This is history however, and people know that there were CIA employees who acted as though, as far as the outside world was concerned, were Foreign Service Officers at the post. The formula up to then provided the actual salaries and allowances of these people, but took no real account of the administrative costs that were created by their being at these posts. So we developed a very simple formula that said we know, based on the last three years, in addition to his salary, and allowances, etcetera, it costs us X number of dollars a year to support every foreign service person at a post. And the average at NEA is thus and so. It took a little bit of doing.

But Bill Crockett was then the Under secretary or Deputy Under secretary of State for Management. He saw the wisdom of this approach immediately. After a little bit of pushing and shoving with CIA, they also had to admit that we probably had been short changed in the past. And this gave the State Department suddenly a much larger amount of money

almost overnight than it had been getting. So I became sort of a small hero in those circles.

Q: In what you've been saying you said you sort of enjoy getting outside the budget and fiscal side but they kept pushing you back in. Did you feel somewhat restive being in this particular rather specialized branch of the service?

KRYZA: I did when I was limited to the budget and fiscal end of it. But then I branched out to become an administrative officer, a broader thing. In fact, I had two very marvelous bosses in NEA/EX. One is Barr Washburn from whom I learned a great deal, and the other was the late Adrian Middleton who was his Deputy. After about two years in the Budget Office they felt that I had gone about as far as I could in that field. And they made me a Post Management Officer for the South Asian part of the NEA Bureau which would be India, Pakistan, now called Sri Lanka, in those days Colombia.

Q: I would like to talk about the role of the Post Management Officer. But I think we can probably pick that up later when we're dealing with Africa. Because I would like to move on to Africa.

KRYZA: We're there now. At the end of my four-year stint in the Bureau of NEA I was transferred to Nairobi, Kenya as Administrative Officer. We arrived after a lovely journey there, we flew to Europe and then took the French, the Messageries Maritimes.

Q: The what?

KRYZA: The Messageries Maritimes, the French line that serviced the Indian Ocean. We sailed through the Suez Canal. My children enjoyed that immensely. We spent a day in Djibouti. And I recall my younger son saying, “Dad, is this Africa?” And I said, “yes, this is Africa.” And he said, “let's go back home.” But be that as it may we arrived in Mombasa and flew on to Nairobi where we had four, almost five years of one of the most interesting assignments that I've had.

Q: Could you describe the situation as you saw it in Nairobi when you got there?

KRYZA: As I say, we arrived in March of 1963, which was nine months before independence, the normal gestation period. Jomo Kenyatta was still languishing in jail.

Q: He was really in jail. I had forgotten that.

KRYZA: Still in jail.

Q: He was still in jail.

KRYZA: In fact, the story was that the British were deliberately trying to make him into an alcoholic by almost force feeding him whatever he wanted to drink. The situation, especially in the light of what had happened over the past two years in the Belgian Congo, now called Zaire, the British settlers in Kenya were obviously a little concerned. There were some good things about it from our point of view. One could buy real estate dirt cheap, but one had to have cash on the barrel. I did convince the Foreign Buildings Office that now was the time to buy some property. And they did, which is rather unusual for the FBO people to do. We bought five or six very choice pieces of property, residential properties, which have probably increased in value at least ten-fold, more than that I'm sure, in the last 25 years.

But independence came on December 12th without too much of a hitch. I'm not sure of the exact sequence, but it all happened within three to four weeks of independence. Incidentally, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which in those days before independence were treated as two separate countries, had obtained their independence either just before, within a matter of days, or just after Nairobi. I'll have to check my records to see how it happened.

Shortly after independence there was a minor rebellion, a military rebellion in Kenya. The British wasted no time in sending back some paratroopers and put law and order back in.

There was still a tremendous power struggle going on within Kenya as between Kenyatta and his political party and the man we refer to as Mr. Double O, Oginga Odinga, who was somewhat of a radical, probably supported by the Soviets. But there was a much more serious event that took place in Zanzibar. There was an uprising both in Tanganyika, still called Tanganyika, and in Zanzibar.

Let me go back just a second. At independence we agreed with the Kenyans that we would not have a military presence there. We would not have a military attach#, a defense attach#. Nor would we ever become involved in military aid, because the Kenyans felt that if they gave us permission to do that they would have to give the same kinds of permission to other countries, the Soviets and perhaps the PRC and they weren't willing to do that. As a result, I happened to be the only officer at the post who had had some naval experience. Mombasa was a Port of Call for the Navy. And it was my very pleasant duty to go down to Mombasa every time before a naval visit, do all the administrative arrangements and protocol arrangements. There was a British liaison office in Mombasa.

The point I'm trying to make is at any given moment there were usually U.S. naval ships in the area. So when things erupted in Zanzibar the destroyer USS Manley was in the area. And we from the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in effect gave the Manley its instructions. We maneuvered the Manley. The Manley brought—his name was Piccard, our Consul General—and his family. We used the Manley to evacuate U.S. citizens from Zanzibar, brought them into Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika.

It was a very hairy experience. It was either just before Christmas or right after Christmas. It was during that. It was an all-hands evolution for the people in the Embassy. And I must say everyone at the Embassy involved did an excellent job.

Q: Well, let's talk a little about this. How did this work? There was a crisis in a country, a neighboring country where obviously you had the best means of helping them? But what could you do other than say to the Manley, go get them?

KRYZA: That's about all. The U.S. missions both in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam were out of business for all intents. They did not have the communications capability. At the time of independence the Department of State had decided that Nairobi would be sort of the regional, and still is, the regional center for East Africa, that is the Regional Security Officer was in Nairobi, the Regional Labor Officer, etcetera and etcetera.

Also we had a regional communications. Nairobi had the link with the rest of the world and Zanzibar, Uganda and Tanganyika had feeder lines into Nairobi. So we were the communications hub. Anything coming from those posts had to be relayed through us. Their only alternative was to go through the British or through the local post office. That's why we were so heavily involved, because we were, among other things, the communication link. We also sent officers to Dar es Salaam because the post was a relatively small one, understaffed. In fact, our DCM, Jim Ruchti, went there for a couple of weeks. And a more junior officer, a fellow named Dave Segal, acquitted himself extremely well with reporting events.

Q: The other person was somebody named Ruchti?

KRYZA: James Ruchti, R-U-C-H-T-I. He was the Deputy Chief of Mission. The Department had not yet named an ambassador to Kenya. So all this happened, we were operating with the—. The man who had been the Consul General and had arrived the same time I did about nine months before independence thought that he was going to become the first ambassador to Kenya. He probably would have but he made some speeches that I think sounded too liberal to some of the Senators who have to pass on ambassadorial appointments and apparently his name had to be withdrawn. So the first ambassador to Kenya was a political appointee, a good close friend of John F. Kennedy's. Of course, John F. Kennedy had already been assassinated, that just two weeks before independence, which also put a damper on anything we could do for the independence.

We did send a rather impressive delegation from the United States to be the official participants.

Q: Well, the new ambassador is William Attwood.

KRYZA: William Attwood, a journalist by profession, Look magazine. He had worked for the Herald Tribune after World War II in Paris. He and Art Buchwald were close friends. He was an American born in Paris and he married a French lady born in the United States, if my recollection is right.

Q: Let's talk about—here you had a political appointee at obviously an emerging situation, which would call for a certain amount of professional handling. You had a newly independent country. You had revolts sort of in the area. I mean, there was unrest around there. And how did Ambassador Attwood work?

KRYZA: Let's remember he was no neophyte. He was a political appointee but he'd spent his entire adult life reporting on political and other events just as a very young man after World War II in Paris. He's very recently published a book or written a book recently published, recounts his adult working professional life. He'd also had one tough embassy under his belt. His first assignment was in Conakry.

Q: Oh, yes.

KRYZA: So he's had his experience.

Q: Conakry is the capital of—

KRYZA: Guinea.

Q: Guinea.

KRYZA: He'd had, and this is the only totally communist country in Africa in those days.

Q: Yes, that's right. So he was loaded for bear when he arrived at your—

KRYZA: I'll digress a little bit. Unfortunately, just after leaving Kenya where he'd had a very successful two or two and a half year tour of duty, he'd even bought a large piece of property with the idea of coming back and living there, to retire. But he very hastily wrote a book. And he says he wrote this book on the train between New Canaan, Connecticut and New York. This was after he'd left Kenya and went back to Look magazine and then later became the editor publisher of News day. But in any event, he hastily wrote this book which he called The Reds and The Blacks, After the Pushkin novel, whatever. It was kind of a kiss and tell. And it was too early after, so he became persona non grata. The book offended Kenyatta and other members of the—.

Q: Well, as a matter of fact there were repercussions on this. Because in an interview I have done not too long ago with Robinson McIlvaine who was ambassador there.

KRYZA: Right, exactly.

Q: He was saying that Kenyatta and his top cabinet people were so burned by this book that they weren't seeing ambassadors very much. And that this did leave really a bad atmosphere there.

KRYZA: It did. It did.

Q: But going back to the situation, let's talk about how the Embassy worked. Did you have sort of staff meetings? Did you get involved in things other than administrative work? What were your responsibilities and how did you work within the Embassy?

KRYZA: Bill Attwood did believe very, very thoroughly in the staff approach. We had—I'm at a loss for a word—what do you call the team?

Q: The country team.

KRYZA: The country team. Thank you, sir. That's my old age. We had country team meetings at least once a week. There was close coordination. Sometimes the representative of the CIA was a little bit too coy, but normally our discussions were pretty open. Jim Ruchti was an excellent Deputy Chief of Mission. Unfortunately, as is often the case, the senior representatives of the other agencies, namely USIA, USAID—we had a huge AID mission there, not only a country mission but a regional AID office. And, of course, CIA. We also had a Civil Aviation attach#. We had a Labor attach#. And as is usually the case most of these people were senior to our Deputy Chief of Mission in personal rank and in salary. So it made the job of the Deputy Chief of Mission a little bit difficult.

Q: One of the problems that one notes in this, you were talking earlier about sharing administrative costs and all and this has come out in other interviews, is that if a post is attractive as Athens was at one time, as Paris is, Switzerland, what have you all the government agencies that have some regional interest such as Treasury or Civil Air all flock to what is considered the most healthy post. Not with the reason that they've got good communications but it means that a post in a healthy climate such as Nairobi can get overwhelmed. Did you find this is a problem? Because it was really your baby.

KRYZA: That brings to mind a story that I'd almost forgotten. And this gentleman has since then become one of my best friends, but I recall we got a message from the Library of Congress. It said, “Mr. So and So plans to come to Nairobi and would like to speak to you”—this was addressed to the Ambassador—”to you and your administrative officer.” And this gentleman appeared and he approached the Ambassador, we met in the Ambassador's office. He said we want to establish a Library of Congress regional office. The Ambassador said, you've got to be kidding. What is this, some kind of cover for another agency? And the guy said, no I'm serious. We feel that there's—and we have other regional offices. We have one, either have one or are going to have one in India, and we're going to have one someplace in South America. It's our job to collect

data, I mean, get these books, get them identified and classified and get them into our Library of Congress records and so on. And sure enough we established a Library of Congress regional office in Nairobi. It soon, God, it was one of the larger, maybe 30 or 40 employees. I ran into the same person a few years later, in fact, he was my next door neighbor in Rio de Janeiro where he headed up a much larger Library of Congress regional office. But that I think illustrates the point that people do tend to flock. These other agencies that feel they have some interest abroad or in the conduct of foreign relations one way or another tend to gravitate towards the more pleasant spots.

Q: Well, did you find that these organizations which at least one could say were somewhat peripheral to our main interest in Nairobi itself, do these tend to overwhelm your peripheral interests in Kenya? Do these tend to overwhelm sort of the administrative side? You spent more time than you felt you should?

KRYZA: They could. They were not only peripheral. They could sometimes raise eyebrows among the Kenyans, especially in the government. We had to make certain that they understood that this was exactly what it purported to be and nothing beyond that. Yes, it did create administrative workloads. But I think that number one, we had some very understanding people back home in the Bureau of African Affairs and we were able to get the resources. They doing the same things that I used to do in the NEA Bureau, making certain that before these activities were allowed to be put in place that they were reasonably adequately funded. There was always a running battle between the State Department and USAID regarding who does what to whom and where the money comes from. But we were usually able to work that out mainly through goodwill or good rapport with one's opposite numbers.

Q: How effective, again looking at it strictly from your viewpoint, how effective do you think USAID was in Kenya at the time you were there?

KRYZA: I would say on balance reasonably effective. They were involved in—it's been so many years ago I've forgotten the projects they were involved in. I know they were heavy in education. They were heavy in, of course, agriculture and drought correction and so on. I would say by and large it was—

Q: Did you find the hand was, or the AID influence was a little too intrusive did you think? Or was it designed really for the country?

KRYZA: I think you've hit it. It was, maybe not too intrusive, but it certainly was intrusive. Depending upon who the AID director happened to be, he could exercise a great deal of political clout if he wanted to. The man who hands the government these huge whopping checks certainly is going to get their attention perhaps a little more readily than the ambassador.

Q: Was this a problem?

KRYZA: It could have been. I don't think it ever was.

Q: Because I know there were other places where I've heard stories where all the local government officials would flock and talk to the AID Director and ignore the Ambassador.

KRYZA: Yes.

Q: Which did not leave for good feelings or effective policy.

KRYZA: Yes, I saw that happen when I was a Post Management Officer in Dacca, in those days East Pakistan. When the AID Director—incidentally the same AID Director we've had for a while in Kenya—after a hurricane, outmaneuvered our consul general. It made the headlines of the paper and so forth.

In any event, I think the country team concept in Kenya worked reasonably well. And I think Ambassador Attwood did have his hand on the throttle and had things under

control.One of the most interesting, if I can tell an anecdote. Around Thanksgiving Day 1964 the Congo, the Belgian Congo, was still the scene of very bloody warfare. Various factions were at war with one another. And one faction of rebels under a man named Thomas Kanza, K-A-N-Z-A, had captured Stanleyville. They took the Acting American Counsel, a man named Mike Hoyt, as a hostage, and one or two other official Americans. It was a very small post. But they also captured several American missionaries including —the name escapes me but I can fill it in later—a missionary doctor, M.D. In fact, they forced the American consul to eat the American flag. They also captured a rather large number of Belgians. The OAU, the Organization of African Unity, had just been formed with headquarters in Ethiopia.

Q: Addis Ababa, yeah.

KRYZA: And the OAU, because this situation in the Congo had come to an impasse, the OAU had asked—by that time Jomo Kenyatta had achieved the stature of sort of a senior, elderly statesman in Africa—they asked Jomo if he would try to mediate. And so Jomo called a meeting, asked Mr. Kanza to come to Nairobi and Ambassador Attwood to participate and the Belgian ambassador, and somebody from the Moise Tshombe side of the Belgian Congo. Meanwhile, we had already put into place. We and the Belgians had poised and ready on the Ascension Islands some U.S. aircraft. I think they were C130s, with Belgian paratroopers, so that if the talks failed—

Q: This is called Operation Red Dragon I believe.

KRYZA: Something like that.

Q: Dragon Rouge.

KRYZA: Dragon Rouge. Well, the talks did fail. And we had the telegram ready to go and we sent the telegram. Little did the Ambassador know, and Jim Ruchti and everyone else know, that it just happened on that day we were redoing our telephone lines within the

Embassy, which was a rented building—we had the four top stories of the building—and somebody had clipped the wrong wire. And we had lost communication with the outside world. I sweated blood but I got the message out. I had to call upon my friends in the British Embassy and so on. But to this day the powers that were in the Embassy did not know that we literally had lost, owing to some Indian poobah, you know, the expression Indian poobah. Most of the skilled labor in Kenya was performed by Indian Sikhs, the electricians and so on. But somebody had clipped the wrong wire and for just that critical period we were out of touch with the world. That couldn't happen in these days.

Q: One would like to believe that.

KRYZA: In any event, the operation happened. It took place. Most of the people were rescued. I have a painting on my wall in my office, an African artist perception, of what happened there. He's given it a lot of poetic license. In any event, the medical doctor was killed in the operation. Everyone else was saved.

Q: We've done an interview with Douglas MacArthur who helped put this together in Brussels.

KRYZA: Brussels, that's right.

Q: With the Belgians. Well, now moving to dealing with the government of Kenya, you were there at a time where I assume that many of the colonials, now ex-colonials, British, who were a particular group in Kenya were always considered a rather spoiled lot. They had had a very nice life and they didn't like to see this change and many were not taking this very graciously. Kenyatta came in but sort of at that point was co-opting the ex-colonials. How did you as the Administrative Officer, having to deal on an hourly basis with the Kenya government, whom did you deal with? How effective were they in this time of transition?

KRYZA: Okay. I dealt I suppose principally with the Chief of Protocol who was an Arab, a Zanzibari Arab, named Inowe who later on transferred his allegiance to one of the emirates I think and later became an ambassador for—I've forgotten the name of one of the Arab countries, the ambassador to the United States about ten years ago. He was very cooperative. In fact, he and I worked very closely together. I helped get his brother a job, which didn't hurt matters any. In fact, they were setting up something very much akin to our Foreign Service Institute. I helped them set it up. I gave them copies of our regulations. They didn't have a real body of regulations to guide their foreign service officers. So they were forming a foreign service of their own. And we worked very closely with them.

Q: Well, did you find the Kenyans were sort of looking to the Americans—in the first place we were English speaking and this was their second language—looking to us as sort of an alternative to the British for technical expertise and this type of thing.

KRYZA: Probably. I think they were still more or less wedded to the British system, but I think they were looking for alternatives. At least they were testing the water. They wanted to see if there were ways where they could use the techniques of perhaps both where they weren't in direct conflict with one another. That was my impression. Among the British that were held over as permanent secretaries or whatever, the one that I remember most vividly is a Scotsman, his name escapes me now, who was responsible for the real property. I was very much involved in purchasing, well, first purchasing these five residential properties but more important than that, prior or just I think at the time of independence, we purchased some land. No, it must have been before, we purchased it from the British. We purchased some very choice property as the site of our potential Embassy. There were some payments that kept coming up and the Foreign Buildings Office never had the money. It was my unfortunate duty to go hat in hand to this Scotsman and explain why we were not making this payment, but we wanted another year's extension. I had lots of fun doing that. We eventually resolved the whole thing. We now have a chancery. I don't think that it's the identical site. I think because we delayed

so long that the Kenyan government took that particular site away from us and substituted another one. But in any event the problem seems to have worked its way through. And we now have—I haven't seen it, but they tell me it's a very handsome chancery.

Q: Well, were you having any problems with the—I mean, after all, a new government coming into place is bad enough in the United States dealing with a new administration, but when you all of a sudden have a country independent and one that has been kept very dependent up to that point. Were there some major problems in running things?

KRYZA: There could have been, yes. There could have been. And things could change literally overnight, a government policy. For example, I alluded to the Indian poobahs. The first level of supervision and the skilled labor level was dominated by the Indians. The Africans hadn't achieved these skills. So they were the straw bosses, the first line supervisors. Depending upon which way the wind was blowing among the top government leaders, the Indians were either in favor or they were in disfavor. We relied very heavily, particularly at the airport. Nairobi was a Mecca for delegations from Washington and elsewhere in the United States. As I recall, Senator Robert Kennedy came two or three times during my stay. Tom Mboya who probably would have succeeded Kenyatta as President, was a bright young guy, close to the Kennedy family, all kinds of intercultural agreements.

Q: He was later assassinated.

KRYZA: Later assassinated, that's right. So we relied very, very heavily on the people that actually did the work at the airport. You know, it's one thing to get all the clearances for the airplane and get the use of the VIP room. But if you don't have someone at the airport who can make sure that everything happens on time you're lost. So there were times when for reasons that we could understand that suddenly a new policy said, henceforth, these Indians will no longer be in charge. From now on the African's going to be the boss. We

still had to work through the Indian even though he was no longer the boss. But it took a lot of—

Q: It was a transitional period.

KRYZA: It was a transitional period. One had to be very light-footed. One had to be able to change, to adapt to a new situation. One could not allow his frustrations to create problems. Yes, it was difficult. But the problems were never insurmountable. One always found a solution. But I'm sure that the job in Kenya and later on in Kinshasa in my view is much more interesting than the job in Paris or in London where things—you have a different set of problems obviously. But I was much closer to, in a sense, being a mayor of a little city running the various aspects of it. Because we provided housing for all the Americans there and furniture and so on.

Q: Before we move to your next assignment, I would like to ask you as I was turning over the cassette you had mentioned that there was our own problem of transition after Attwood had left which is something that maybe future managers might keep in mind. And that is not leaving a Deputy Chief of Mission too long at a post and then expect them to take a subordinate position. There was some sort of a problem there.

KRYZA: I think you said that very well in a nutshell, yes. I want to preface anything I say with the statement I'm talking about very good people, every one of them. What I'm saying should not be taken in any sense as disparagement. There was a long hiatus between the departure of Ambassador Attwood and the arrival of Ambassador Glen Ferguson. Jim Ruchti was in charge during this period and I must say ran a very good ship. It was also during that period that Attwood wrote the book, The Reds and The Blacks, which made Jim's life a little more difficult. But I think we had adequate access to the Kenyan government.

I'm not sure it's anyone's fault. But the time span was just too great. Jim in effect had became the Ambassador. So there was the inevitable differences when Ambassador

Ferguson had to establish himself, put his own cache on the operation. I think the only lesson to be learned is to try to limit the length of time between the departure of one ambassador and his successor. Or alternatively, after a very brief turnaround period transfer the DCM and let the new ambassador bring in his own alter ego.

Q: Well, now speaking of transfers, I notice you went from being in charge of administration in Nairobi going to Zaire, to Kinshasa for the same job although bigger. How could you be so lucky?

KRYZA: It was not a direct transfer. I spent a year in Montgomery, Alabama at the Air War College, Air University. And there were several opportunities made available to me. But I liked Africa among other things. And Ed Dobyns, D-O-B-Y-N-S, was then the Executive Director of the Bureau of African Affairs. And he approached me. He called me personally several times and said that the Africa Bureau would like to have me there and he gave me some very good reasons. So I took it. I'm not so sure it was a bigger job. It was a much more difficult job. It was the one post where we really did have shared administrative support in every sense of the word. We had what was called a CAMO, Combined Administrative Management Office.

Q: This was sort of a new creation.

KRYZA: Yes. That's why Dobyns wanted me there because it was going to be a test.

Q: This is a type of administrative organization used only in Africa.

KRYZA: That's right. That's exactly why. He was going to be the first one. We had to get the people in AID to cooperate, especially AID, to cooperate with us. And they did. I built up very good relations. In fact, I made it a point to attend AID staff meetings on a regular basis. I in effect became part of—in theory the job of CAMO Director was supposed to report directly to the Ambassador and not to the Deputy Chief of Mission. I didn't think that was going to work for me so I played that one rather loosely. The job was supposed to

be on the same level as the head of any of the other agencies, the same level as the AID Director or the USIA person. Since it was the first time we'd ever tried that I made my own corrections to this end.

Q: One often says that looking at our profession, which is not only Foreign Service but diplomacy, you really don't need diplomacy with other countries but you sure as hell need it—

KRYZA: You do.

Q: —within any Embassy on how to deal with these other sovereign powers, i.e., AID, CIA, military and all the American outfits. Would you agree?

KRYZA: I agree with that wholeheartedly. But turning back to Zaire, it was still called the Belgian Congo when I arrived. The name changed while I was there. Once again, I was blessed. I was lucky. Sheldon Vance—when I first arrived the late Bob McBride was the Ambassador. I hadn't known him before. He left a few months after I arrived. And Sheldon Vance who was an old friend of mine from days in Brussels became the Ambassador. And we had excellent people. The AID Director was first class. The number two man in AID, Don Brown, who later became the AID Director succeeded his boss. He's the brother of Dean Brown. Really a first class person. The USIA guy. He's dead also, the late Aldo D'Alessandro. We had a great country team. We got along extremely well together. By that time I was an FSO-2, fairly senior officer, and was given a lot of latitude by the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission, and the other agencies.

It was also the golden period in our relations with the Congo. The wars had been settled; Mobutu for better or for worse was firmly in charge. This was the time of our first trip to the moon and celebration, the astronauts Armstrong and Collins and what's the third one's name? It will come to me in a second. In any event, they did a jubilant victory around the world trip. The only place they stopped in Africa was Zaire. You know, that gives you

an idea of how safe it had become in our eyes. I was the—what do you call that? The Program Officer, for them, arranging everything there.

We then decided to have an African Chiefs of Mission Conference, in Zaire. The astronauts' visit had gone so beautifully. And Mobutu had built a marvelous conference center. The year before that he had hosted the annual OAU meeting. So he built this at great expense—probably to us, indirectly—this great facility. And we did hold the Chiefs of Mission Conference, and for the first time in the history of the United States, to my knowledge, the United States Secretary of State set foot on Black African soil. William Rogers.

Q: William Rogers.

KRYZA: Headed this group.

Q: Really? Before that time—

KRYZA: I was told that that was the first time the U.S. Secretary of State had set foot in sub-Sahara Africa.

Q: Outside of the normal going up to Egypt.

KRYZA: Well, that's not sub-Sahara.

Q: That's not sub-Sahara.

KRYZA: That's right. Even Morocco.

Q: Well, what was our policy towards Zaire when you were there? I mean, what did we feel we were doing then?

KRYZA: I think that Sheldon Vance's philosophy was: this is the time in the history of our relations where things have reached the point where the private sector, the United States

private sector, can and should become involved. There's lots of incentive. The Lord knows that this country needs all the help that it can get. And he encouraged the private sector. I think that was one of the breakthroughs. In other words, he's been criticized during and perhaps even after that he downplayed some of the corruption, some of the things that one finds in government such as Mobutus or disregarded them. But Sheldon Vance is a good politician and he had good friends well placed in Washington in those days. He had, for example, Frank Carlucci was then in the White House, the job that Hank Cohen has now is the African man on the NSC. Frank Carlucci had served in the Congo and knew some of the problems. So Vance was able to flatter Mobutu by getting him appointments with the President every time he came to the United States. Vance was able to convince the United States government that it was in our interest to keep providing military and economic assistance and so on. Now, whether this period of good will was created by that policy or whether it just happened to coincide with Sheldon Vance's tour of duty there, these were the golden days, the only golden days in Zaire. Everything has gone, has deteriorated.

Q: Because everything seems to have gone down hill.

KRYZA: Down hill.

Q: You were both with your role as the head of CAMO— you were in the position where within your purview we were spending a lot of money and having a lot of projects. I mean, both the upkeep of the Embassy. Did we have a consulate at that point and a staff?

KRYZA: We had one in Lubumbashi. Once again we did some creative thinking. USIA had an interest in—once again, the country was opening up. It was safe for—

Q: Lubumbashi is the old—

KRYZA: Lubumbashi is the old Elisabethville.

Q: Elisabethville.

KRYZA: And that had never closed. That had been there. We closed Stanleyville, which is now called Kisangani, after the incident that I recounted. After the Stanleyville, or during the Stanleyville drop, which is what that Dragon Rouge was called. There was one other consulate. USIA wanted to have reading rooms in Kisangani and one other place. It will come to me sooner or later. And so we worked out a deal. We said we'll pay for one and you pay for the other. We'll send one man and wife team.

Q: Who'll pay? You mean—

KRYZA: USIA will pay for the operations of one of these outposts. The State Department will pay for the other. We will cross train our people. We will make our FSO-7, we'll train him in what you people do. He'll learn something about running a library and answering and showing films. And we will train your guy to be a vice consul. We'll give him—this is before ConGen Rosslyn. But we'll give him some training so that he can issue visas when required and answer the questions that are required of a Vice Consul. And that worked reasonably well. This is creative thinking. This is in pursuance of the policy. And after a great deal of reluctance the Peace Corps accepted Vance's rather rosy picture of life in Zaire. Then the Peace Corps came in in large numbers.

Q: Well, now with all your administrative responsibility obviously you were dealing with the Congolese of Zaire all the time.

KRYZA: That was difficult.

Q: How did you deal with them?

KRYZA: Very gingerly. There was lots of give and take.

Q: Who was giving and who was taking?

KRYZA: That's right. You had to make certain that—not out and out bribery. But you had to make certain that gifts were given at Christmas time. It's a different mentality. And one had to be—

Q: I'd like to examine this a bit if you don't mind. Because I know, I'm speaking from my experience. There is a different attitude in many countries. And one can call it corruption but at the same time it's sort of, if you don't do me a favor of some kind—I mean, maybe not necessarily a deliberate payoff, but give me a present— I'm not going to do something for you. And how did you deal with it?

KRYZA: First let me state that we didn't need too much help from the Zairians. We were pretty much a self-contained—I use the word being mayor of a small town. Now, there that was really the case. We literally had our own fire department. We had our own police department. This was something we arranged. There were still large numbers of U.N. personnel who'd been there during the war, you know, during the various wars. They had certain assets including people who were trained in police type activities. We had some vehicles, jeeps. They had some vehicles. And we signed an agreement with the U.N. to provide police protection literally for the people of our respective organizations. And then I think other embassies bought into this thing, either in kind or in cash. So we had round the clock—the U.N. provided the communication center. So in the event there was any problem there was a quick reaction, just like running a 911 number here in Washington, D.C. And it was extremely effective.

Q: Was there much crime?

KRYZA: There was pilfering. There was crime particularly up—people liked to live up in the hills in a place called Jellabinga, lovely big houses. But, you know, kind of isolated. And very, very tempting too. Yes, there was a lot of pilfering.

Q: So this was not a precaution.

KRYZA: No.

Q: This was a necessity.

KRYZA: A necessity. And we provided so-called sentenelles, that is watchmen. Every single house had round the clock. These were the dregs of society. They're probably always asleep. Of course, we could not arm them. We gave them a club and a whistle. And their job was to sit or stand or sleep outside the house and to patrol it. But when we formed this police force with the U.N. we were then able to supervise these sentenelles on a regular basis. So at least we knew that they were awake most of the time. So the answer to your question, we did not have to depend very much on the host government.

Where we needed their help was in the administrative part of it, the Office of Protocol, the clearing through customs and so on. And there we had to rely on our good, usually Belgians who had been there for a couple of generations who knew exactly what had to be done. And we didn't ask too many questions. When something had to be brought in through customs and someone raised questions we turned it over to our so-called expediter. The same thing was true with the airport. It could take the neophyte forever to work his way through the airport, the formalities, passport, health, all these things. This is leaving the country, to say nothing of getting in the country. So you really needed an expediter who could handle this. My only claim to fame is once after—I think when I was an Inspector I happened to come back into—no, when I was Executive Director of the Bureau I happened to come back into Zaire. And for some reason or other the Embassy's expediter, a new person, had fallen asleep. And it was an early morning arrival. He wasn't there. I had to make my way through. I did all by myself and I felt that I'd accomplished something. My problem is I didn't have any money. I didn't have any. I had U.S. dollars and large bills and I wasn't about to part with $20 bills at every stop. But I made it without giving anybody a bribe and that's a real accomplishment.

Q: Moving on. Because I feel we want to concentrate in this interview on your time in Africa, dealing with Africa, I'm going to sort of skip reluctantly over your time as Administrative Counselor in Rio and Brasilia in Brazil.

KRYZA: That's fine.

Q: You became an Inspector.

KRYZA: I became an Inspector in 1972.

Q: This is 19—

KRYZA: '72.

Q: Did you inspect Africa at all?

KRYZA: Yes, I did. My maiden voyage as an inspector was Vietnam. That's an interesting thing but I'll just touch upon it. That was followed immediately with an inspection, without even coming home. I went direct from Saigon to London where I met my wife for a few days and then went on to—I'm not sure which order, I think it was Accra first, Accra, Guinea. Accra, Ghana. And then Monrovia, Liberia. Inspecting both of these posts. Monrovia was still a fairly prosperous city in those days. It was before the descendants of the American slaves had been deposed. So it was still fairly corrupt. It was still fairly well run. Pan Americans still had big interests, running a hotel there, etcetera. Ghana had really suffered from Nkrumah's excesses. And it was sad because Ghana is one of my favorite countries in Africa. It has a culture all its own. But in any event I spent a month in each of these places as an inspector.

Q: Well, how did you—looking at it now from coming from as an Inspector, how well do you think we were running these posts in Africa?

KRYZA: Those two posts at that particular time, extremely well under all the adverse circumstances. Yes, I would say extremely well. There wasn't much one could do in Ghana as far as relations were concerned except to maintain relations. And the people we had there did an excellent job.

Liberia. Of course, we had these close ties with them since day one. And those were the days when we had just built this magnificent hospital, that John F. Kennedy Hospital, and equipped it extremely well. Things were going well. AID played an important part. A few years later, of course, when the descendants of the American slaves were deposed things have changed dramatically. I would not want to be in Monrovia right now.

Q: No. We're coming to your time. We're talking about as you left being an inspector and you became the Executive Director.

KRYZA: Became the Executive Director.

Q: Of African Affairs.

KRYZA: That's correct.

Q: The African Bureau from 1974 to 1977. You know, this is one of the key jobs in the Department of State and yet often overlooked, particularly I'm thinking of the executive bureaus. I wonder if you could explain what you were doing as the Executive Director.

KRYZA: The Executive Director of a Regional Bureau is the resources manager of that bureau. And I think this needs some background information. The Department of State is divided into five—let's back track. In the conduct of foreign relations 95 percent of the bilateral decisions that are made are made at the Assistant Secretary of State of a Regional Bureau level or beneath. Only 5 percent of the decisions are made at the Under Secretary of State, at the seventh floor level.

Q: Seventh floor being where the Secretary of State anare.

KRYZA: The Secretary of State and the Under secretaries reside.

Q: Of the State Department Building.

KRYZA: The Department in its wisdom divides the world into five parts. So in effect you've got five dukedoms, each one headed by an Assistant Secretary of State. These are called the regionals. These are the people, as I say, that conduct foreign relations with the countries in that particular area. And once again, 95 percent of the decisions are made in that Bureau, most of them at the desk officers level. But the more important ones reached the Assistant Secretary of State level. The Executive Director is responsible, one, to the Assistant Secretary to give him advice and counsel on the management not only of the Bureau but of the various posts. The Executive Director is responsible for obtaining the necessary funding for creating the positions and managing the various positions, that is the manpower requirements, for working out the intricate reimbursement arrangements with the other participating departments and agencies for maintaining close liaison with the various functional bureaus in the Department of State, particularly the Bureau of Administration and the people in the management—the Office of the Under secretary of State for Management.

The Executive Director and his staff get involved very intimately in the staffing of the posts with the exception—in Africa I won't even make this exception, I was going to say with the exception of the Chief of Mission. But I often had, and I'm sure my predecessors and my successors have, some influence in the names that go up to the White House.

Q: You mean as far as those being—

KRYZA: Those posts, yes. Yes, to be considered for nomination as an ambassador. But I cannot over-emphasize, and this may have changed since I retired, how much control, not only substantively, but also administratively, is exercised by that regional bureau. In other

words, it is not the bureau of administration or the bureau of management that determines what is going to happen in terms of resources, be it money or people in Kenya or in Zaire. It's the Bureau of African Affairs that makes that determination.

Q: How does the Executive Director fit into the Bureau? Let's start with Africa.

KRYZA: Hierarchically in some bureaus they've even given them the title—I don't think any of them have it now—he is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He's on that level. In some bureaus his efficiency report is written by the Assistant Secretary, but more times than not it's written by the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary. If he's got the confidence of his Assistant Secretary he gets no supervision whatsoever. He gets guidance, but he's never told what to do and how to do it. In fact, it's contrary. He tells the Assistant Secretary.

Q: Well, how did you get along—Richard Moose was the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs I think almost the entire time.

KRYZA: Oh, no. No, no, no, no. On the contrary. During most of my time I had an old friend of mine, William Schaufele.

Q: William Schaufele.

KRYZA: Before that I had Nat King. I was appointed, I was given the job by—now, I've got a memory—. The man who now heads up the Africa Bureau, Donald Easum. Donald Easum who had been appointed by Kissinger who had suddenly discovered Africa. Shortly after I was appointed to the job I joined Donald Easum and others for a sort of mini-East African, ambassadorial conference of U.S. Ambassadors and Consuls General in the East African part. We met in Zambia, Lusaka. interesting enough, you were asking about some of the things that happened in the Executive Director's Office. The American Ambassador to Zambia—her name was Jean Wilkowski. Her tour of duty had run out and she was going to be replaced. It was all very routine. Before the office in the Bureau of Personnel

that deals with ambassadorial appointments usually puts out a press release when there's either a confirmation of a new ambassador or notification that the current ambassador is going to be relieved of his responsibilities. And that release, that press release is usually cleared through the Executive Director's office of the regional bureau concerned. Usually this is a very routine thing. And the call is usually handled by the Personnel Officer who works for the Executive Director.

In this particular case, though, this release was approved on a very routine basis. Because the person who gave the approval from the regional bureau just wasn't privy to what was going on. They didn't know that Henry Kissinger was going to be making a call or a visit to Zambia. And his visit would coincide with the release of this. So we had to squelch that immediately. As a result, Jean Wilkowski spent a few more months in Zambia than she had expected because it would have given the wrong signal. This is just a little thing that can affect the conduct of foreign relations.

Q: Well, now one of the things I would like to ask, you were sitting here at staff meetings and all that. One does not have the feeling that Africa was very high on anyone's list in that period, opening of China, other things were there. What was our—how did you feel what our policy was towards Africa when you were sitting in Washington?

KRYZA: I think one of our policies within the bureau was to acquaint the Secretary on the seventh floor of what we considered to be the importance of events in Africa. Of course, we did have the Angolan situation and the Mozambique situation going on at that particular time. We had some crises situations, as you may recall. As you said earlier, one often has to exercise as much if not more diplomacy in one's own organization as one does with the host government elsewhere. And one of the things we had to do was convince Dr. Kissinger that Africa was important for various reasons. In fact, he began holding regular meetings with the African nations. He did that I think on a quarterly basis. He didn't always attend himself. Sometimes at the last moment he would send a substitute to act on his behalf. But there was an awakening of some interest. And, of course, we had these crises

from time to time which would have to involve the Secretary's time and attention. But you're absolutely right, in the scale of things compared to what was going on elsewhere we certainly was a—

Q: Is this good or bad? I mean, from your point of view does this mean you can run your own show without—

KRYZA: I think you've hit upon something very important. It's both good and bad. But from my point of view it was good. We could do things without being the object of too much scrutiny from above. We had the sympathy of the people that we had to lean on for resources and so on. We had the sympathy of the Director General's Office and John Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration and so on. Because we were the poor kids on the block. We did have difficulty convincing good officers that they should come to Africa. But I think we were able to convince young, bright people that they could get much more exposure to decision making at a much more junior level by coming to an African post.

Q: I would have thought that with sort of the collapse of the core—we had people who'd specialize in Vietnam or in Thai or something, where the focus of interest was at that time, this is Soviet language specialty had sort of fallen into disfavor, unpleasant post, not much feeling of having much important to do there and all—that Africa would be a place that would attract the young professional or the eager young professional. Because, one, as you say you get more responsibility. But also at the end of the goal, at least in those days, it was about the one place in the world there was a reasonable chance of becoming an ambassador as opposed to other places which often were political appointments. No matter how well you did some car salesman was likely to get the nod who contributed a lot of money to a Republican or Democrat presidential candidate.

KRYZA: Yes. You're absolutely right. In fact, just as I was attracted to Africa when I saw and heard about these winds of change that were blowing, I think it attracted many

younger officers during the period from the early '60s, probably until as recently as six or seven years ago when the disappointment began to set in. You know, we were very eager in the early '60s and we thought that the changes were really going to take place for the better. But history has shown that Africa is probably worse off now in many ways. Most African countries have not been able to deal adequately with independence, with running themselves. And people who had been interested are becoming discouraged. But yet if you look down the roster and look at the names of the Chiefs of Missions, the Ambassadors in our various African countries, these were the people who were FSO-8s in the mid-1960s and not necessarily made a career of Africa but spent most of the past 20 years involved in African affairs. The one who learned to engineer their careers the best are the ones that would take an out-of-area assignment, let's say in Latin America, to develop a skill in another language and get some perspective but then come back.

And I'm thinking of people like Jeff Davidow who was just recently nominated as Ambassador to Zambia once again. Mary Ryan who used to work for me as a Post Management Officer is now going to Swaziland as Ambassador. She didn't devote all of her career to Africa but she certainly was in and out.

But this is true. We had some very good people who sincerely felt that there was a lot that could be done.

Q: But you had to work at it you felt in order to attract people. I mean, it was a little bit like a recruiting center, each bureau trying to get the people they wanted in.

KRYZA: Right. And then we had to do other things to lure people into Africa. We gained a reputation as being able to provide the best in terms of housing, furniture. We tried to make it as easy as possible for people. And we also helped establish schools.

Among the many things I did in Zaire, I was the President of the American School of Kinshasa which was a highly political thing because the school had been formed years and years ago by American missionaries who formed hostels in, in those days,

Leopoldville, probably ten or fifteen different denominations. But each denomination would have one man and white team of missionaries remain in the capital city to run a hostile for the kids of the evangelizers, the proselytizers who were going out into the bushes. And so the school was fairly well established when after independence this huge horde of official Americans descended upon them. And then with our encouragement of private sector Americans the missionaries soon were out numbered, say, three to one. But running for office on the school board was a very political thing. There were about a thousand students which meant that you had about a thousand families involved. And I managed to run for office and win twice. Anyway, that's an aside.

Q: Well, no. That really is interesting. Actually, because of time I would like to move on now. How did you become Ambassador to Mauritania, appointed Ambassador to Mauritania?

KRYZA: I really don't know. I was ready to—I was approaching, I was about 54 years old. I was thinking seriously that I had done what probably I was able to do in the Foreign Service. And I had been offered a job in the U.N. with the—what's the U.N. organization in Canada? ICAO. I was seriously considering taking—in fact, I had accepted it. One of the functional Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the Administrative area had never been to Africa and I was taking a trip to Africa. It was going to be my final trip as the Executive Director. Then I met my wife in France on the way back to attend my niece's—you may remember my late wife was French—to attend my niece's wedding. And I got a phone call from the Office of the Director General saying: how would you like to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. I said I didn't think so, but give me 48 hours and I'll call back. My wife wasn't all that keen on going. But I looked upon it as, after all, why does one join the Foreign Service? This was the ultimate, whether it's Mauritania or Paris. So I accepted it. the people at the other end said, thank goodness, because your name has already gone to the White House. So I really never worked for Moose. He had come in just about that time. In fact, he may have been instrumental in getting me the appointment.

Q: Well, as you saw it what was our interest in Mauritania at that time? We're talking about when?

KRYZA: We're talking 1977.

Q: '77.

KRYZA: Middle of 1977. Our interests were almost non-existent. Mauritania is kind of an artificial country. It didn't really exist prior to World War II or even during World War II. It was part of French West Africa. I guess that's what they called it. About the time of World War II, the French discovered that there were some important deposits of iron ore in the northern part of what is now Mauritania. So they established a presence. They began to mine the iron ore. The built a port facility. It was called Port Etienne.

Q: Port of what?

KRYZA: The French word for Steven, E-T-I-E-N-N-E which is now—do you have a map of Africa? They've changed the name of the port to Nouadhibou. In any event our interests were extremely limited. My predecessor was Holsey Handyside who believed in a very lean operation. We had one or two very small AID projects going and the Peace Corps was beginning to knock on our door. But the conditions were not all that good to want to have. But Holsey Handyside did agree just before his departure to allow I think about 30 Peace Corps volunteers to come in. It turned out to be a very good decision. In fact, I expanded on it when I was Ambassador. Our interests were as I say very, very—

Q: No economic interests particularly?

KRYZA: There's nothing, no. There's nothing in Mauritania. There's no trade of any substance where the iron ore is of not much importance to us. It's of great importance to the Japanese. It's a special kind. It was merely, I think, we have an Embassy there because after the independence movement in Africa took place we fortunately or

unfortunately made a decision that we would establish an embassy in every independent country and send an ambassador there. I looked upon my role there as trying to help the Mauritanians get themselves established, some economic basis.

Aside from the iron ore the only other resource they have is in the ocean. They have some of the richest fisheries in the world by dint of circumstances. The way the configuration of the floor of the ocean, the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, all these things do something that attracts certain types of small fish which in turn attract larger fish. So according to the experts you get, and according to an amateur fisherman like myself, I ate some of the most delicious freshest fish in the world. But the trouble with that is a poor country like Mauritania does not have the infrastructure of the capability to exploit this wonderful resource. And what happens is that countries like the Soviet Union, like the Japanese, like Spain, like Korea, who tend to do their fishing in these huge fishing factories. They're self contained. They do it all at sea. Send their huge trawlers, fishing factories in there and literally rape the bottom. They destroy the ecology.

One of the few things that I think I did, and it still exists I'm told, is through the good offices of the U.S. Coast Guard and USAID we provided the Mauritanians with a Coast Guard cutter and trained them how to use it. How effective that one Coast Guard cutter is against the Japanese who are invading, in effect encroaching upon Mauritanian waters. The big fishers, the people involved like Del Monte and others involved in tuna harvesting and canning, were never really interested. We'd had talks with them. Never really interested because of the high cost. We apparently require on-shore infrastructure to do all this kind of thing. And also they felt, I guess there are different types of tuna. And the type of tuna we eat in the United States is slightly different. This was a type of tuna that you would get in Spain. In any event that was one thing that we tried.

Meanwhile, the Sahara Desert keeps moving inexorably down and down and down. Where as recently as 25 or 30 years ago Mauritania was actually a net exporter of meat, it's now virtually all desert. And what's happened is whereas even when Holsey

Handyside was Ambassador there—Mauritania is a relatively large country in terms of area, geographically. One of the larger countries in Africa. But it has a small population, probably less than two million people. And it's an admixture of black Africans. More than half the people you'll see in Mauritania have black skins. That does not mean that they classify themselves as blacks. You're either a black or you're an Arab. And one can have real black skin and one can still be an Arab. It depends on the language that one speaks at home, etcetera. As late as perhaps the time just before my arrival, mid-1970, 85 percent of Mauritania's population was nomadic. And only 15 percent was sedentary.

Q: Yes, you were still talking.

KRYZA: The people who were sedentary were in just little pockets, one at Rosso, across the river from St. Louis. St. Louis is in Senegal. Obviously along the river you had some blacks who did some marginal farming. The city of Nouakchott is an artificial city like Brasilia and Washington, D.C. It was designed by a group of French architects, city planners, to comfortably accommodate thirty to forty thousand people. It was going to be an administrative center. It does not have a natural port. I could talk for hours on this. But maybe we can come back later. So you had a few people in Nouakchott. Then you had a few people up north involved in the iron ore. All the rest of the people were nomads. They traveled with their camels and their sheep and their goats. Now the situation has more than reversed itself. Now you have something like 85 percent who are sedentary and 15 percent who are nomadic. And almost all of the sedentary people have moved to Nouakchott, a city that was designed for thirty or forty thousand people at most now has literally 85 percent of the population. It's approaching a million people is what I'm told.

Q: What sort of political environment were you dealing with when you were in Mauritania?

KRYZA: The situation in Mauritania in the late 1970—well, late 1977 early '78—the situation leading up to the coup was one in which the military had become very disenchanted with its participation in the war against the so-called Polisario in what had

been Spanish Sahara. Morocco claimed rights over that territory going back into historic precedent. For reasons that were best known to the participants at that time, Mauritania joined forces with the Moroccans to try to oust the freedom fighters, the Polisario. It was an unhappy marriage from the very beginning, Morocco being the dominant by far of the two countries—Morocco staking claim to the more productive, in terms of minerals, two-thirds of Western Sahara, and Mauritania being left with what was more or less the dregs of the country, very non-productive desert.

It was a losing war. And more important than that—I use the term losing—it was a war that really could not be won decisively with the kinds of activities, the kinds of resources that were available.

But more important than that to Mauritania, the war was going on adjacent to the most vulnerable part of Mauritania, that is the iron ore mines. The iron ore is located 600 kilometers from the ocean, from the port. So a single track rail line joins the mines with the Port of Nouadhibou whence the ore is shipped abroad. Obviously this rail line was extremely vulnerable to attack. So not only was Mauritania using a great deal of its treasury in fighting this war and losing some of its finest young men, but it was also very literally losing its only source of foreign capital.

One thing led to another. And the founding father, the George Washington of Mauritania, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, was ousted sometime—I don't have precise dates, I can fill that in later—sometime in June of 1978. That is roughly seven or eight months after my arrival. It just so happened that the American Embassy compound is directly adjacent to the presidency. So in effect it was my next door neighbor that was being removed from power. It was not a frightening experience. But we were obviously apprehensive.

Q: Was it a bloody coup?

KRYZA: Well, there was very little bloodshed. There was a lot of posturing. The military were out. And there were tanks parked around our compound. We were forbidden either

from leaving or from entering. Luckily, I had two or three people in the compound. And so we had excellent communication facilities. Unfortunately, my DCM was off on a trip in the interior, and the Chief of Station was out of the country. So I was pretty much the only substantive reporting officer at the time. But as I say we had excellent communications. And for one of the few times that I can remember, the telephone system within Nouakchott worked. Most of the staff had walkie talkie radio communication. But we didn't even have to use that, we were able to use the regular telephones. And we were able to ascertain almost immediately that everyone was accounted for. No one outside the palace was touched.

Q: When you have a coup like this, you as an ambassador, what is your prime concern? You hear there's a coup going on.

KRYZA: Well, our first concern was to make sure that everyone in the mission was aware that there was danger and that they should stay put. Of course, the next in order of importance was to let the Department of State know that something was amiss and to inform them also that as far as we could determine, all the Americans were accounted for including our Peace Corps volunteers. That was of some concern. The coup was limited. It was indeed a palace coup. So there was not widespread activity except in the downtown or in the area of the presidency. The president had his residence and the office of the presidency in one large compound which happened to be right next door to the American compound. We were able to carry on conversations with the other western embassies.

The Spanish Embassy compound was immediately adjacent to us on the other side. We had that presidency on one side and the Spanish Embassy. Next to it was the German Embassy, the West German Embassy and next to it was the French Embassy. So by walking through our backyards in effect we could maintain conversation and communication with the French and the Germans and the Spaniards. Makhtar Ould Daddah was put into, well, house arrest is the expression they use. They kept moving him around the country from time to time. He was still well-loved by most of the citizens. They

had nothing against him personally. But I think most of the citizens who were aware of what was going on did support the military action in withdrawing Mauritania from that war.

Q: This was the incident, I mean, this was the cause.

KRYZA: It was the cause that was triggered off. Then, of course, the military could never get its act together. The man who first took charge was probably the most competent, I may have my sequence wrong, was killed in an unfortunate aviation accident landing at the airport in Dakar, Senegal. And then there was a succession—during my time there were three additional changes. And these were all completely bloodless, as just palace takeovers, changes within the military from one colonel to another, usually resulting in house arrest. But there was very little violence. In fact, my perceptions of the Mauritanians are that they are non-violent. Typical of most nomadic people, they tend to be philosophers, poets by nature. Fairly gentle people.

Aside from the war, the Polisario war, and aside from the constant drought and the spreading of the desert, the biggest political problem related to the two basic groups of people, the African ethnics and the so-called Arabs. As a compromise, much as took place in Belgium, the Mauritanians decided that French would be their official language and Hassanya Arabic would be their national language. Now, you tell me what the distinction is between the official and a national language. The point of it is that all decrees, all government documents had to be done in both languages. All street signs were in both languages. And every year at the beginning of the school year, the only time I saw any violence on the streets, the question was which language would dominate in the school system in the upcoming school year. These problems, of course, were never resolved. In effect, the blacks, the non-Arabic blacks, they're non-Arabic but they were Islamic. Ninety-nine percent of the country is Islamic. The blacks have an advantage, because to get a good job in the civil service it was important that one have French and Arabic. And actually the French was probably more important than the Arabic. So in that sense, the blacks had a better chance of getting second and even first level. The secretariats in many of the

ministries often were headed by blacks because they were truly more bilingual than the ethnic Arabs.

Q: Which foreign country was sort of the major one? Was it France, if not calling the shots, but being sort of the predominant country?

KRYZA: Yes. Although France never took a great interest in Mauritania, it was legally part of France immediately after World War II. Yes, the ties were still towards France. However, before the coup and even after the coup, before Mauritania broke with Morocco, and in effect changed sides from siding with Morocco and being against Algeria shortly after I left, they completely reversed themselves and became more or less the enemies of Morocco and the friends of Algeria. The Algerians were supposedly backing very heavily the rebels of the so-called Polisario. But, yes, the French ambassador had a great deal more influence than I had, obviously. And as I was going to say, until they broke with Morocco, King Hassan used to look upon his ambassador in Nouakchott as sort of a viceroy. And every time there was a change in government in Mauritania, he fired his ambassador. So I went through four coups and four changes of Moroccan ambassadors, which was interesting.

Q: Uneasy lies the head of a Moroccan ambassador.

KRYZA: Yes. They were all good people. We became very friendly with all of them—we meaning my wife and myself, the members of the Embassy, having lived in Morocco early on in my career and my wife especially had some affinity. We still love, I still love Moroccan cuisine.The other countries that were represented—of course, all the Arab countries had some form of representation—many of the black African countries had some representation. The Soviet Union had a large number of people but we could never figure out what they were doing.

As far as we could determine there was no economic assistance. They had no AID projects. There was a considerable amount of educational, you know, cultural, that is

they sponsored, they provided scholarships for Mauritanians. Many of the engineers who worked in the iron ore fields were trained in Russia. And oddly enough they were very private-enterprise oriented, probably as a result of their experience in the Soviet Union. But the big mystery was the People's Republic of China. In the inscrutable fashion of the Chinese, someone made a determination that Mauritania, in the long run at least, was going to be important to China. And of all the countries, all the so-called donor countries, China spent easily more than all the rest of the countries including the United States combined as far as I could determine. They financed an east-west road from the coast to the Malian border through the desert. The actual building was done by a Brazilian firm, but the financing came from the Chinese. They built a sports stadium. They built a youth center. They built several medical clinics throughout the country.

But their single most ambitious product, and I don't know whether they ever finished it, was to build a deep-water port in Nouakchott. As I said earlier, Nouakchott is an artificial city designed by the French to be the capital of the new country. But if you've ever seen the coast of West Africa it's a very formidable thing. There are a few pockets where there are natural harbors. But there are very few of them. And with the constant pounding of the sea the Chinese undertook to build this. It was a tremendous undertaking to do a deep-sea port, a deep-water port. And they poured in Lord knows how much money. And there were always large numbers of Chinese, not as large in numbers as the Chinese wanted to have, but certainly far out numbering other foreign nationals.

Q: But were you as ambassador trying to look for AID projects or really sort of sitting back and relaxing?

KRYZA: No, I was not sitting back and relaxing. I was encouraged by the Department because our principal interest in Mauritania, aside from being there, was humanitarian. We were very much aware of the drought, very much aware of the poverty. And we looked for projects that could have long-term effect. We tried to do projects that we labeled renewable resources, to try to find innovative ways to replant the forest, to stop that

movement of the desert. We did quite a bit of agricultural projects along the river, along the southern border, on the Senegal River, which still had arable land. The desert had not yet crept up to it. Trying to keep the desert back in that area.

There were political problems because the river, of course, was the habitat of the blacks. And so the Arabs who still dominated; although middle management was black the authority was essentially Arabic. We were under constant pressure to do things in the northern part in the real desert. There we did less in the agricultural. We did some date oasis-type restorations. But there we concentrated essentially on health care, that is we sent competent teams of nurses. These are essentially Peace Corps combination social workers and trained nurses. We put them in various so-called urban areas where we taught hygiene, prepared young mothers for the delivery and taught them how to care for their progeny. That essentially is what we did. We kept a relatively low profile.

Q: Well, how did you get along with—this is now the Carter Administration?

KRYZA: This is the Carter Administration.

Q: How did you get along with the African Bureau in those days?

KRYZA: Extremely well.

Q: And they gave you the support you needed?

KRYZA: They gave me excellent support. Mauritania, there are two countries that are in the African Bureau that could just as well be in the Near East Bureau. So maybe I should rephrase my answer. I got excellent support. Among other things I had just come from the Bureau and many of the people that were supporting me were people that I had worked with. In fact, my Deputy as Executive Director took over my job. So that was helpful in terms of resources. I think I was well placed.

In terms of substantive support it was good. But as I was starting to say, Mauritania and the Sudan could perhaps be better served if they were part of the Near East Bureau because the focus—the people in the Bureau, Near East and South Asian Affairs were much more concerned about the Polisarios activity and relations with Algeria and Morocco than the Bureau of African Affairs was, for reasons that are fairly understandable. As I say, you have the same problem on the eastern end with the Sudan.

In other words, I was the Ambassador to a country that had one foot in the Arab world and the other foot in the black world. In that sense it was a rather interesting locus for reporting because we were able to get the flavor of Mauritania's relations both with the Arabs and the Africans. They attended all the OAU meetings and they attended all the Arab summits and all the regional alliances of Arab countries. They in those days had good relations with Qadhafi. That's changed since then.

So in that sense we were able to get from time to time tidbits of information that might not be available elsewhere. I had an excellent DCM.

Q: Who was that?

KRYZA: Charles Dunbar who is now an Ambassador in one of the Arab Emirates I believe.

Q: Was Qadhafi and Libya a problem?

KRYZA: Qadhafi was a role model for the military in Mauritania, as he probably is in other parts of North Africa. He was looked upon as the legitimate successor of Nasser. He was looked upon as the man who could unify North Africa, the Arab-speaking North Africa.

Q: I realize you have to hurry. So you retire from the Foreign Service from Mauritania.

KRYZA: I left Mauritania in the middle, the third quarter of 1980 and retired I think at the end of September of that year.

Q: Well, looking back on your career, what could you say you feel is your greatest accomplishment personally?

KRYZA: I'd be hard pressed to answer that question. Perhaps what gave me the most satisfaction was the job that I had in—I'm saying this in retrospect, at the time I was there I perhaps wouldn't have said that—but the two and a half years or so that I spent in Zaire I think there were so many things that by coincidence we in the embassy and I as the counselor for administration and head of the CAMO operation, we were able to do things and actually see the results of what we did during that two year period. And I enjoyed, this is in a non-diplomatic area, but I enjoyed some of the things that I was able to do in the American community at large such as being the president of the American school board and working with the Zairian government so as to get a tract of land from them so that we could take this school from a place that it was occupying several ramshackle residential buildings and build a proper campus with housing for the teachers, a 40 hectare plot of land which is more than 80 acres of land. So we were able to build up and of course it wasn't finished in my time. But we were well along the way by the time I left. So that's not a diplomatic accomplishment.

Q: No, but I mean this is part of—this comes with the job.

KRYZA: It gave me a great deal of satisfaction.

Q: Just one final question we try to ask everyone. What do you think of the Foreign Service today as a career?

KRYZA: That's once again a difficult question. I think I personally would be less inclined to join the Foreign Service today than I was 40 years ago, not because the challenges were no longer there, but for some—I think the system has become more rigid. There are more constraints. The freedom of action, the ability for an individual to take initiatives I believe are less available than they were 30 years ago. The opportunities to be innovative and to

be creative I think are perhaps from my point of view, at least they're less apparent to me than they were.

Q: Well, I thank you very much and that's it.

KRYZA: Well, thank you.

End of interview